INTRODUCTION INTRODUCTION INTRODUCTION INTRODUCTION
As a kind of interactive two-way communication channel, network bridges the communication gap between the subjects in the market, and realizes trade negotiation and trading activities under different asynchrony with low transaction cost. The development of electronic commerce makes bargaining mechanism innovation, especially the loose group which the supply chain consists of a plurality of enterprises, hope that negotiate on trade through the electronic commercial platform, in order to identify common transaction price and the respective number. Recently, some electronic commercial platform which started to launch shopping assistant or shopping agency with some negotiation functions [9] , which puts forward a new problem to the research of pricing mechanism.
From researches on pricing model under electronic commerce we can see, most of scholars quoted the manufacturer's learning mechanism to solve it. Gupta et al. (2002) established a Dutch auction model based on network environment, using the Markov decision process model, and Q -learning algorithm, only the price game situation is discussed [1] . Carvalhbo et al. ( 2003 ) using Kalman filtering method, gives a heuristic algorithm to guide the future pricing with previous transaction information, which cannot adjust the current pricing timely [2] Raju et al. (2005) consider monopoly electronic retailer's pricing and inventory problems, price are made by the seller, the buyer obtain products according to the bid price level [3] ; There are also some other scholars study online reverse auction problem [4] [5] , they believe that online reverse auction is becoming a new vitality way to trade, with the rising status of buyer (including individual, organization or enterprise) ,the buyers is gradually playing a leading role in trade. Tang Qiusheng etc. (2012) established MeRCRM quantity discount game model based on the theory of Stackelberg, which achieved the purpose to improve the sales and the manufacturer, retailer's income [6] ; Based on data driven, He Zhigan etc. (2011) set model view controler (MVC)
as the basic framework, presented a new price pricing model on online shopping mall which describe reference price trend chart very well [7] .
These studies have rarely considered that under the electronic commerce environment, trade state changed by both common decision-making behavior is a game between buyer and seller matchmaking transaction. The traditional auction theory mainly for a fixed quantity of auction through the auction price formation, which is usually high value and less number items, the affect of auction transaction volume is less considered [8] . But for the large scale supply or demand problem of many manufacturers or distributors, it needs to consider the relationship between trading volume and price.
This paper studies the manufacturers and dealers in the product transaction, both sides under the incomplete information game environment make t their initial price and quantity to maximize their individual interests, and repeated comparison together in the third party trading system based on the sealed private valuation, and finally form a transaction price and transaction volume.
MODEL MODEL MODEL MODEL ANALYSIS ANALYSIS ANALYSIS ANALYSIS AND AND AND AND ASSUMPTIONS ASSUMPTIONS ASSUMPTIONS ASSUMPTIONS
Because of the random factors and incomplete information transparency, from the consumer market to the dealer, and then to the manufacturers, the information from demand information transfer to order information, and then form to supply information, there is bullwhip effect of supply and demand, so both sides in the transfer price determined and the corresponding quantity could not coordinated, performance on a transfer price, it existences quantitative differences in optimal product identified by both sides, both parties to determine the optimal product quantity differences according to the minimum quantity, the minimum number of transactions is not able to achieve the maximum benefits of the whole supply chain. So in the supply chain alliance, the leading party or third party determine the optimal market sales and initial transfer price according to the maximum benefits of the whole supply chain , under the electronic commerce environment, it is very easy to implement alliance member according to the transfer price and order quantity, a closed price negotiation will be carry out in the electronic commerce platform, then form a new price and feedback to all members, all members submit new quantity according to the new price and benefit maximization, like this repeated negotiation ,finally realize interest distribution mechanism, and this price reflects interest distribution mechanism and relationship in the alliance. This transaction mechanism is similar to the trading agent with negotiation function mentioned in Strbel Michael (2000) [9] , the core problem is the design of interest distribution mechanism, so that the sealed price matchmaking platform can reflect the characteristics and requirements of the sale of both buyers and sellers, realize the price and quantity both sides can accept. This paper holds that the bargaining ability of both buyers and sellers and their respective demand or supply elasticity related.
Hypothesis Hypothesis Hypothesis Hypothesis
1 ) many manufacturers in auction platform are regarded as a whole, the same to dealers, that is, only one manufacturer and one distributor, both sides need to clinch a deal;
2) the relative elasticity greater, the advantage of interests distribution more;
3 ) Both manufacturers and dealers determine their optimal quantity based on profit maximization; 4) manufacturers understand their supply function, and dealers know demand function, both buyers and sellers know their own elastic but do not know each other's; 5 ) As the auction platform ,the third party can learn characteristics of supply function and demand function on a certain degree through the relationship between the declared price and quantity after displaying price of both sides; 6) Dealers purchase cycle is fixed constant T, manufacturers forecast production and delivery in [0,K] according to predict situation based on
,dealers and manufacturers make a auction match on day K , after closing the auction , the manufacturer can complement the parts beyond expected. Because of the distribution process, the commodity will be served at the end of day T-K.
SET SET SET SET NEGOTIATED NEGOTIATED NEGOTIATED NEGOTIATED PRICING PRICING PRICING PRICING MODEL MODEL MODEL MODEL
The paper established a new negotiation model and algorithm in electronic business environment, to realize the supply and demand sides submit product quantity according to the price, and adjust the price further until it reaches the bargain transaction requirement. First assume that demand and supply curve are linear, the third party e-commerce platform gives the product polling price, later become display price, due to the linear demand and supply, need only two times submitted quantity according to price ,we can determine the linear demand function and supply function in the electronic commerce platform:
The demand curve:
The supply curve:
, we get the coordinates of the intersection, i.e. the equilibrium price and equilibrium quantity ( Figure 1 ): 2). The initial prices p1 and p2 are located above the equilibrium price
In this case, p1>p2>p*. After the display of the initial price series p1,p2, the manufacturers and distributors submitted orderly the trade numbers they want according to these prices , therefore, the demand points A,B and supply points C,F on prices p1,p2 all are above equilibrium point M(see figure 4) . The intersection point M3(Q3,p3) of the line AB and CF is the point on which makes a price match, that must be below the point M ,
supply curve S and demand curve D . The price p3 was the first match price, according that the manufacturers and distributors submitted the new trade numbers and form new demand point E and supply point H, then, the lines EF and HB formed the cross intersection point chords, so situation 2 changed to situation 1.
3). The condition when the initial prices p1 and p2 are located below the equilibrium price
In this case, p1<p2<p*. After the display of the initial price series p1,p2, the manufacturers and distributors submit orderly the available trade numbers, and therefore the demand points A,B and supply points C,F on prices p1,p2 are all below equilibrium point M(see figure 5 ). Under these three conditions above, the displayed price series {pk}(k=3,4,5…) are all convergent resembling convergence of Newton tangent method. Newton tangent method utilizes tangents and axis to form recursive points, and converges fast. This paper utilizes chord intersection to form recursive points, with which method it converges to the same order. Given the rather complex cost-benefit analysis during the companies' matching process, the times of price matching must be reduced. The basic rules are that under the condition when the demand differs considerably from the supply after the price is displayed for the first time, and the distance between second displayed price and the first displayed price should be sufficient, not be too small or too big. When the distance satisfies |p2 -p1|<| p* -p1|, the larger the distance is, the faster the convergence speed will be. Such as in figure 5 , the intersection point M3(Q3, p3) mounts at an accelerating rate when the dotted line p = p2 translates upwards; when the distance is too large that |p2-p1|>| p*-p1| , the condition of negotiated pricing changes into the condition when first equilibrium price is located between the initial prices p1
and p2. Under this condition, the convergence speed will get slower as the distance gets larger, but the reducing process is decelerated and has no impact on convergence. This paper provides the node gradually recursion algorithm:
Step1 Step1 Step1 Step1. Displayed price on e-commerce platform p1, the manufacturers and distributors submit available trade numbers S1, D1.
Step2 Step2 Step2 Step2. If | S1 -D1|< ε ( ε is the difference between supply and demand amounts), the matchmaking succeeds, and then exit the cycle and execute step 9.
Step3 Step3 Step3 Step3. According to the difference of S1, D1, the platform displayed the second price p2 (if S1>D1, then p2<p1,otherwise p2>p1), and the manufacturers and distributors submit available trade numbers S2, D2.
Step4 Step4 Step4 Step4. If | S2-D2|< ε , the matchmaking succeeds, and then exit the cycle and execute step 9.
Step5 Step5 Step5 Step5. According to the 2 nd expression, calculate the bargaining price Step7 Step7 Step7 Step7. If | S3-D3|< ε , the matchmaking succeeds, and then exit the cycle and execute step 9.
Step8 Step8 Step8 Step8. If (D1-S1)(D2-S2)<0, let p2=min(p1,p2), S2=min(S1,S2), D2=max(D1,D2), p1=p3, D1=D3, S1=S3, then turn to step 5; otherwise, if(D1-S1)(D2-S2)>0, let p1=p2, D1=D2, S1=S2; p2=p3, D2=D3, S2=S3, then turn to step
5.
Step9 Step9 Step9 Step9. Output the bargaining price p* (the final displayed price on the platform) and bargaining amount Q*, 
CONCLUSIONS CONCLUSIONS CONCLUSIONS CONCLUSIONS
This paper proved related theorems about intersecting chords, especially the theorem that the recursive process of intersecting chords which cross the intersection will finally converge to intersection of curves. It also provides theoretical support for the convergence of price match, and thus it can be confirmed that concave supply function and demand function could close a deal according to node gradually recursion algorithm.
Besides, as the recursive process of intersecting chords which cross the intersection is high order convergence, there generally would be relatively rare times of price match before equilibrium, and both sides of the transaction would be liable to accept and glad to participate in quoting price. Moreover, this algorithm is of benefit for controlling cost of e-commerce platform, and it is of good practicability.
